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Cole and Erickson: Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers,

audiences are contained within the
nation-state structure. When war is a
contest between two sides, the audiences
are easy to identify, and traditionally
these audiences understand the outcome of the war in terms of the contest
between the armed forces of the sides.
When multiple strategic audiences, some
of them not contained within or associated with nation-states, do not understand or interpret the military outcome
in the same way, “the military outcome
does not provide a stable basis upon
which to define a conflict’s outcome.”
Simpson argues that “strategic confusion
can result when conflicts characterized
by competition between many actors in
a fragmented political environment are
shoehorned into a traditional concept of
war, which is two polarized sides.” The
information revolution and advances
in communications and social media
have exacerbated this problem, forcing
overlap not only between the tactical
and strategic levels of war but between
the tactical and policy levels as well.

have weighed in on the changed nature
of warfare in the twenty-first century,
such as David Kilcullen, Colonel Gian
Gentile, and Antonio Giustozzi. A
visiting defense fellow at Oxford in
2011, Simpson fuses a firm grasp of
traditional humanities and philosophy
with his experience in Afghanistan.

Simpson describes war as a competition
between strategic narratives. Accordingly, planners at all levels should be
targeting strategic audiences as centers
of gravity. It is a matter not so much of
the Clausewitzian dictum that war is
designed to compel your enemy to do
your will but of compelling your target
audience to understand your message.
War from the Ground Up provides case
studies for this proposition ranging
from the coalition effort in Afghanistan
in 2006 to the British strategy in the
Borneo conflict in the mid-1960s. The
author also addresses other insurgencies throughout the narrative, including
the conflict in Sri Lanka and Russian
operations in Chechnya, and refers to
the work of prominent authors who

Andrew S. Erickson is a leading authority on Chinese naval developments.
His research and linguistic abilities are
matched by his careful, systematic analysis. In this work Erickson thoroughly
surveys the existing literature in English
and Chinese addressing Beijing’s efforts
to deploy antiship ballistic missiles
(ASBMs) able to strike large warships at
ranges of more than a thousand miles.
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He has provided us with what may be
one of the most important books on
strategy in a long time. No short review
can do justice to this remarkable book,
which should be read by all military
officers and policy makers, as well as
anyone involved with the planning
and execution of military operations.
JEFFREY SHAW

Naval War College

Erickson, Andrew S. Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications. Washington, D.C.:
Jamestown Foundation, 2013. 110pp. $18

The author credits China with developing ASBMs as part of its strategy of “using the land to control the sea.” However,
this represents a misinterpretation of naval history. While it is true that “a ship’s a
fool to fight a fort,” it is also true that no
nation has successfully defeated a naval
force with land power alone. Examples
include President Thomas Jefferson’s
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construction of coastal forts and of
a fleet of inshore gunboats to fight
Britain’s global navy, and the successful U.S. amphibious campaign against
Japan’s island bastions in World War II.
Erickson’s key question is, How successful is China’s ASBM system? He
concludes that a functioning ASBM
has been developed by Beijing but
that final operating capacity remains a
work in progress. Erickson highlights
a crucial weakness in China’s efforts
to deploy such a complex system of
systems when he describes the “tremendously complex and difficult
process” of ensuring “extremely close
coordination” among several branches
and agencies in a Chinese bureaucracy
notable for lacking that attribute.
The ASBM-warhead issue is not satisfactorily addressed in the literature. Why
would a U.S. commander assume that
an incoming ballistic missile is armed
with a conventional warhead and not a
nuclear one? Employing ASBMs poses a
possibly insuperable danger of escalation
from conventional to nuclear warfare.
As Erickson points out in his conclusion,
“PLA sources reveal overconfidence
in China’s ability to control escalation,
which is itself an extraordinary danger.”
The author’s conclusion that an aircraft carrier group “would have a large
electromagnetic signature” ignores the
progress made in the 1980s in operating
under dramatically reduced electronic
emissions conditions. Also, the author
errs if he attributes to China a unique
policy of “asymmetry” in the development of weapons designed to counter
U.S. military strengths. Any intelligent
military does that. I also question the
author’s conclusion that the United
States is “on the ‘wrong end of physics’” with respect to matching China
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militarily, in view of his inability to
describe countermeasures presently
under development or in force.
However, these are minor criticisms of a
thoughtful evaluation of current Chinese
efforts to defend the homeland and exert
control over the waters Beijing believes
vital to national-security interests. Also
impressive is Erickson’s appreciation of
the possibility of “deeply destabilizing”
strategic effects of successful Chinese
maritime control strategies on the Asian
political situation—that is, a successful ASBM will not simply be a tactical
weapon. This is a book that every naval
officer and civilian analyst must read.
BERNARD D. COLE

National Defense University

Nordquist, Myron H., and John Norton Moore,
eds. Maritime Border Diplomacy. Boston, Mass.:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2012. 366pp. $146.98

In 2011 the thirty-fifth annual conference on the law of the sea and oceans
policy was held in Bali, Indonesia.
The conference attracted (as it always
does) an impressive array of presenters
and attendees. The editors offer with
this work a compilation of the papers
presented. Perhaps because they made
no concessions to make the presentations “accessible,” the result is something of a rarity—a compilation that
remains interesting and useful. Each of
the seven sections has much to recommend it. All are potentially useful, and
the “Dispute Settlement Mechanisms”
section is especially well presented.
This collection is a fascinating spectrum of topics ranging from specific
cases, such as the “2008 China-Japan
Agreement on Cooperation for the
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